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CASE COMMENT
CRIMINAL LAw DOUBLE JEOPARDY MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS
DEFENDANT CONVICTED OF HOUSEBREAKING AND ROBBERY NOT ENTITLED TO
PosT-CoNviCTION RELIEF FROM CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WHERE THE OFFENSES ARE FOUND To BE SEPARATE. On April 28, 1958, a nine-count in-

dictment was returned in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia against the appellant, Roy J. Irby, and George W. Foster, charging
them with one count of housebreaking, one count of robbery, one count of attempted robbery, and four counts of assault with a dangerous weapon. Count
nine charged Irby with carrying a dangerous weapon." On June 6, 1958, after
appellant had been examined and found competent to stand trial, he was arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty to all counts.2 On July 21, 1958, appel-

lant, represented by counsel, withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea
of guilty to the counts of housebreaking3 and robbery. 4 The remaining counts
of the indictment were dismissed. Thereafter, appellant received consecutive
sentences of from two to eight years for the offense of housebreaking and from
four to twelve years for the offense of robbery. On March 19, 1965, after completing his term of imprisonment for the housebreaking offense, appellant moved
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255' to have his sentence for robbery vacated or corrected
on the ground that the two sentences could not validly have been made to run
consecutively. After conducting a hearing on appellant's petition and taking
the matter under advisement, the District Court for the District of Columbia
denied the motion.
Irby appealed, and in an opinion dated March 15, 1967, a panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Judge
McGowan dissenting, reversed and remanded the case to the district court for
resentencing on the robbery count. However, in response to the Government's
petition for a rehearing en banc, the judgment of the panel was vacated and a
rehearing was ordered. After the rehearing, the majority of the District of Columbia Circuit Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held: a
1 Brief for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by
Howard P. Willens as Amicus Curiae at 1, Irby v. United States, No. 19988 (D.C. Cir.,
Nov. 17, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Amicus Curiae].
2 Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 1.
3 Count one read as follows: "On or about February 24, 1958, within the District of
Columbia, George W. Foster and Roy J. Irby entered the dwelling of David J. Weltman and
Claire G. Weltman, with intent to steal property of another." Brief for Appellee at 2, Irby v.
United States, No. 19988 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 17, 1967).
4 Count three charged:
On or about February 24, 1958, within the District of Columbia, George W. Foster
and Roy J. Irby, by force and violence and against resistance and by sudden and
stealthy seizure and snatching and by putting in fear, stole and took from the person
and from the immediate actual possession of Claire G. Weltman, property of Claire
G. Weltman, of the value of about $2200.00, consisting of one fingerring of the
value of $1400.00 and one tingerring of the value of $800.00. Brief for Appellee
at 2, Irby v. United States, No. 19988 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 17, 1967).
5
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence . . . was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law ... may move the court which imposed
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
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person convicted of housebreaking and robbery is not entitled to post-conviction
relief from consecutive sentences under the rule of lenity where it appears that
Congress intended the offenses to be separate. Irby v. United States, No. 19988
(D.C. Cir., Nov. 17, 1967).
The protection against double jeopardy guaranteed in the Federal Constitution6 and most state constitutions7 represents two distinct policies: (1) no
person should be punished more than once for the same offense; 8 and (2) no
one should be prosecuted more than once for the same offense.9 It has been said
that
[t]he ban on multiple punishment imposes a limitation on judicial interpretation of substantive criminal law. It forbids penalizing an accused
more severely than the law provides, through the device of finding that he
has committed several violations of substantive law where only one exists. °
The restriction on multiple prosecutions, on the other hand, is designed to
implement such procedural objectives as economy of time and money, avoidance
of unnecessary harassment," and psychological security. 2
However, the rules that bar retrial and those that prohibit multiple punishment have a critical similarity. In both cases, their scope depends on what is
meant by "the same offense.""3 In answer to this fundamental double jeopardy
question, one writer has stated:
According to ordinary language, two offenses are the same offense only if
they are identical in law and fact .

. .

. The phrase "has committed an

offense" is used as a substitute for "has failed to comply with some important standard"; and the number of offenses depends upon the number of
standards violated. In the criminal law ... the standards are discrete and
precise. Each legal offense category . . . is a distinct standard, and each

6 U.S. CONST. amend. V: ". . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ....
"
7 Though the phraseology varies, all states except Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, and Vermont have double jeopardy provisions in their constitutions.
8 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169, 173 (1874). See Morgan v. Divine, 237
U.S. 632 (1915); Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915). For a discussion of state
decisions, see People v. Savarese, 114 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Kings County Ct. 1952).
9 This policy has found expression in the maxim "no one shall be twice vexed for one
and the same cause. Nemo debit bis vexari pro una et eadem causa." Ex parte Lange, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168-69 (1874). For a discussion of the origin of the maxim and its
policies, see R. Px.RRINS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 650
(1952).
10 Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeapardy Clauses: New Life for
a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 340 (1956).
11 Hurst v. State, 86 Ala. 604, 6 So. 120 (1889); State v. Hoag, 35 N.J. Super. 555,
561-62, 114 A.2d 573, 577 (App. Div. 1955). The stigma, harassment, and anxiety that
a criminal prosecution entails have most frequently been recognized in cases involving the
constitutional right to a speedy trial. See Ex parte Pickerill, 44 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Tex.
1942); Note, Dismissal of the Indictment as a Remedy for Denial of the Right to Speedy
Trial, 64 YALE L.J. 1208, 1212 (1955).
12 See United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797, 806 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (rehabilitation impossible where further prosecution threatened).
13 For a discussion of the various ways multiple offenses can be committed by a single
act, see Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 MINN. L. REy. 805
(1937).
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failure to comply with a standard constitutes, in ordinary language, an
offense.' 4
Most courts, however, have never confined themselves to such a restricted
definition of "offense." Rather, the majority of courts have sensed that the
policies of double jeopardy often embrace closely related or overlapping offenses.
This insight has prompted a search for a mechanical test to determine what
constitutes an "offense" and has led to considerable debate among courts and
commentators attempting to insure the equitable punishment of an offender
who violates more than one statutory provision in the course of a single criminal
act1 5
Most of the tests employed by the courts to determine the number of
offenses for which an accused may be tried and punished as a result of one act
are variations of the "same evidence" test originally formulated by Buller, J.,
in The King v. Vandercomb & Abbott." Under the terms of this rule,
[a] single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal
or conviction under either statute does not 7exempt the defendant from
prosecution and punishment under the other.1
Illustrative of the "same evidence" test is the decision of the Supreme Court in
Gavieres v. United States which held that a person convicted and punished
under an ordinance prohibiting drunkenness and rude and boisterous language
is not put in second jeopardy by being subsequently tried under another ordinance for insulting a public officer even though the latter charge is based on the
same conduct and language as the former. Relying on two previous decisions, 9
the Supreme Court concluded: "[I]t is apparent that evidence sufficient for
conviction under the first charge would not have convicted under the second
20
indictment."
Although many courts utilize the "same evidence" test as the standard for
determining the number of offenses, some courts have carried it to extreme
literal lengths, thereby subjecting themselves to the charge of splitting offenses. 2'
In fact, "[lt is this very rigidity of application that is the test's greatest weakness."
For example, under a statute forbidding the felonious cutting of mailbags, a strict Supreme Court held that since proof of the cutting of one sack
14 Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 268-69 (1965).
15 See generally Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE
L.J. 513 (1949); Note, supra note 14; Comment supra note 10.
16 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (Ex. 1796): "[U]nless the first indictment were
such as the prisoner might have been convicted upon by proof of the facts contained in the
second indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment can be no bar to the second." Id. at

720, 168 Eng. Rep. at 461.
17
18
19

Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 395 (1902).
220 U.S. 338 (1911).
Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902); Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass.

20

Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 343 (1911).

433 (1871).

21 Comment, Successive Prosecutions Based on the Same Evidence as Double Jeopardy,
40 YALE L.J. 462, 469 (1931).

22 Note, Double Jeopardy and the Concept of Identity of Offenses, 7 BROOKLYN L. Rv.
79, 82 (1937).
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does not support the counts as to the other sacks, the cutting into each of the
several sacks constitutes a separate crime for which the defendant can be separately punished.2" This type of rationale has prompted one commenator to
remark:
It therefore appears that, under [the "same evidence"] rule, an overzealous
prosecuting attorney can, by assiduously using his Thesaurus and statutebook and continually redefining the crime, each time requiring slightly
different24 criminal elements, secure repeated convictions for the same
offense.

The possibility that the "same evidence" test may, in some situations, lead to
an unjust result has been intimated even in cases allowing a second prosecution.2 5
In many instances the "same evidence" test has been departed from in
one way or another. 8 Some courts have adopted the "same transaction" test
which states that there can be only one prosecution, and therefore one punishment, for the consequences of a single criminal transaction." It has also been
held that a second prosecution is barred if the criminal intent involved is the
same as was involved in a former prosecution and such intent constitutes a
material element of the crime in each.2 s Likewise, two alleged offenses have
been held to be one offense in legal contemplation if they both involve a single
act and a single intent. 9 At least one case has suggested a "gravamen of the
offense" test whereby a second prosecution is barred if each prosecution involves
23
24
25

Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625, 631 (1915).
Note, supra note 22.
Whether it is a proper practice to harass and annoy the accused by successive
prosecutions for offenses growing out of the same transaction is a matter which
addresses itself to the sound discretion of the prosecuting attorney, who will be
governed by the circumstances. But it may be doubted whether, in these minor
offenses, the interest of the public is best served by such a course. Territory v.
Stocker, 9 Mont. 6, 11, 22 Pac. 496, 498 (1889).
26 For example, the negative of the "same evidence" rule permits a second trial unless
the evidence sufficient to support a conviction on the second indictment would have warranted
conviction on the first. There is another formulation entitled "Buller's rule backwards" (Buller
is the judge who originally formulated the "same evidence" test in the Vandercomb case), and
still another test combines the rule and the rule backwards. These and other variations are
discussed in Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IowA L. Rav. 317,
321-22 & n.20 (1954). See also Note, supra note 22, at 82-83.
27 Jones v. State, 19 Ala. App. 600, 99 So. 770, cert. denied, 211 Ala. 701, 99 So. 924
(1924) (person cannot be separately punished, under separate counts of an indictment, both
for the possession of liquor for sale and for mere possession); Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 8
(1853) (conviction of burglary constitutes a bar to prosecution for robbery); Worley v.
State, 42 Okl. Crim. 240, 275 Pac. 399 (1929) (conviction of arson for burning goods in a
building precludes prosecution for arson for burning the building); State v. Coffman, 149
Tenn. 525, 261 S.W. 678 (1924) (there can be only one prosecution for the forgery of
several names on one instrument).
28 State v. DeGraffenreid, 9 Baxt. 287 (Tenn. 1878) (conviction of burglary with intent
to commit larceny constituted a bar to prosecution for the larceny); Ashton v. State, 31
Tex. Grim. 482, 21 S.W. 48 (1893) where the court, in holding that a conviction of assault
with intent to murder one person was no bar to a prosecution for a like assault upon another
person committed at the same time, said:
The true test in such cases must be that, if the intent to kill the one is an intention
formed and existing distinct from and independent of the intention to kill the other,
the two acts cannot constitute a single offense. 21 S.W. at 48.
29 Cook v. State, 43 Tex. Grim. 182, 63 S.W. 872 (1901) (an aquittal of assault with
intent to kill C constitutes a bar to prosecution for the murder of D if the two offenses
charged involve "one act, one intent, one volition").
30 State v. Gapen, 17 Ind. App. 524, 527, 45 N.E. 678 (1896). A similar consideration
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the same principal unlawful act.30 This judicial uncertainty and resulting lack
of unanimity over what constitutes the "same offense" has produced the following comment:
It might almost be said that the courts, in attempting to do justice
in the individual cases and at the same time to find some satisfactory
criterion for determining what is the "same offense," have adopted arguments as numerous and varied as the cases themselves. 3 '
In recent years, the Supreme Court has adopted a "rule of lenity" ' 2 which
operates to mitigate the harshness of the "same evidence" rule. The "rule of
lenity" was first announced in Bell v. United States3 where the defendant had,
on the same trip and in the same vehicle, transported two women across state
lines for immoral purposes. He was indicted under the Mann Act and pleaded
guilty on both counts of the indictment, each count referring to a different
woman. The Court concluded that it was not dear that Congress intended
that a person who simultaneously transported more than one woman in violation of the Mann Act should be liable to cumulative punishment for each woman
so transported. Because of this congressional failure to make clear the appropriate unit of prosecution under the statute, the Court stated:
When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress
an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.
And this not out of any sentimental consideration, or for want of sympathy
with the purpose of Congress in proscribing evil or antisocial conduct. It
may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in
the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment. This in no wise implies that language used in criminal statutes
should not be read with the saving grace of common sense with which other
enactments, not cast in technical language, are to be read. Nor does it
assume that offenders against the law carefully read the penal code before
they embark on crime. It merely means that if Congress does not fix the
punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will
be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offense ....

34

The "rule of lenity" is not a casual presumption about legislative intent.
Rather it is a canon of construction that requires that legislative silence be interpreted in favor of lenity when there is doubt as to whether cumulative sentences may be given for the simultaneous violation of overlapping statutes.3 5
The rule is thus designed to prevent multiple judicial punishment for a single
legislative offense, i.e., to preclude substantive double jeopardy.
This "rule of lenity," however, just as its predecessor, the "same evidence"
seems to underlie the decision in State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361 (1833) where a conviction
of arson was held to preclude a prosecution for murder for a death that unintentionally
resulted from the setting of the fire.
31 Note, Criminal Law-Double Jeopardy, 24 MINN. L. RPv. 522, 553 (1940).
32 Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958) (referred to as the "policy" of
lenity). See also Castle v. United States, 368 U.S. 13 (1961); Milanovich v. United States,
365 U.S. 551, 561 (1961) (dissenting opinion).

33 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
34 Id. at 83-84.
35

See Note, supra note 14, at 316.
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test, is not without its shortcomings. In its present stage of development, the
rule is in conflict with the "same evidence" test with respect to underlying purpose and potential application. Sharply divided courts have continually disagreed on its scope. 6 Thus, the rule has failed to provide a reliable guideline
for deciding the legality of cumulative punishments imposed for multiple offenses
arising out of a single course of conduct. Moreover, the rule is totally dependent upon legislative intent and, as Circuit Judge Leventhal pointed out in his
concurring opinion in Irby,
it usually avails little to seek out specific legislative intent as to the particular offenses. Occasionally an ascertainable legislative objective concerning pyramiding of penalties may be discernible where Congress is
addressing itself to a specific type of anti-social conduct. . . .But for the
most part there is no ascertainable legislative intent on cumulation of
punishment in relation to any particular offense or group of offenses even
when the prohibiting statute is one
passed by a national legislature in
37
the exercise of its delegated powers.
On the state and local levels, it is even less likely that any relevant legislative
intent will be found, as to the interrelationship between the crimes involved."8
Finally, it has been suggested that the "rule of lenity" is subject to the
usual deficiencies of a black letter rule of law in that, if strictly applied, the rule
prohibits cumulative punishment regardless of the particular circumstances of
a given case. 9 The sentencing judge is deprived of any discretion with respect
to the imposition of consecutive sentences, even in those cases where it may be
demonstrably necessary or desirable.
As a practical matter, the majority in Irby was able to avoid any consideration of these difficulties by holding that any doubt about what Congress
intended with respect to punishment for the separate crimes of robbery and
housebreaking was insufficient to cause the "rule of lenity" to operate. The
four justices who joined in the majority opinion recognized that the mere
existence of two separate crimes, each with different elements and its own
prescribed punishment, does not necessarily indicate a legislative intent that
such punishments be consecutively imposed. They agreed that any doubt as
to a legislative purpose to encompass both punishments should be resolved in
favor of the "rule of lenity." Nevertheless, the majority was quick to establish
their acceptance of the lower tribunal's ruling "that the degree of doubt discernible on this record does not warrant invocation of the rule of lenity."4 As in
the lower court, the decision was based upon the historic conceptual difference
between housebreaking as a crime against property and robbery as a crime
against the person, as well as the notion that an invasion of the premises to
steal does not irrevocably commit the wrongdoer to rob from the person of
anyone found therein.
36
37
38
39
40

Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 27.
Irby v. United States, No. 19988, at 8-9 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 17, 1967).
Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 31.
Id. at 32.
Irby v. United States, No. 19988, at 3 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 17, 1967).
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The choice is still his up to the moment of confrontation. If he decided
to rob, consecutive punishments are not made available solely as a means
of exacting greater retribution. Congress could well have conceived of
them as a deterrent to compromising the safety of the person as well as
the security of the premises.. . . We cannot, at any rate, say with confidence that Congress did not contemplate some additional disincentive for
the latter. 41
Furthermore, the majority pointed out that Irby's attack on consecutive
sentences was not timely. This argument should have been made at the time
the sentences were imposed, when a meaningful inquiry into the facts would
have been possible.4 2 It was this last point of the majority upon which the
concurring opinion focused. Circuit Judge Leventhal agreed
that it is possible that a combination at one scene of a housebreaking ... ,
and a robbery, may reflect sufficiently separate criminal purposes to permit
consecutive punishment. While they may also, I think, be so integrated
as to preclude consecutive punishment, that objection is one that should
ordinarily be put forward when sentence is imposed, or timely in a motion
to reduce the sentence. 43
As indicated earlier, Justice Leventhal felt that most efforts to ascertain legislative intent, in order to apply the "rule of lenity," would be futile." Consequently,
he advocated the following theory of punishment:
When the same act [of the defendant] can be classified as different crimes,
he may be punished with the most onerous penalty provided for the most
extreme crime for which he was charged. But he is not to be given two
or more consecutive punishments for what is essentially a single criminal
episode . . .45
Finally, Chief Judge Bazelon and Circuit Judge Wright, speaking in dissent and relying primarily upon Prince v. United States,46 felt that the intent
to steal, rather than just the illegal act of entry, is the gravamen of housebreaking.
The applicable statute' defined housebreaking as entry with intent to commit
another crime. The dissenters maintained that Irby had only one criminal
purpose when he committed the two crimes.
We think the record sufficiently shows that defendant entered the dwelling
with the objective of stealing property, by force if necessary, and that he
carried out this objective. Since there is substantial doubt that Congress
intended cumulative punishment in this situation, the rule of lenity must

41 Id. at 4-5.
42 Id. at 7.
43 Id. at 7-8 (concurring opinion).
44 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
45 Irby v. United States, No. 19988, at 9 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 17, 1967) (concurring opinion).
46 352 U.S. 322 (1957). In Prince, the defendant was convicted of robbing a federally
insured bank and entering the bank with intent to commit a felony. The Supreme Court
held that Congress did not intend to punish cumulatively for both the preparation and the
completed crime. Id. at 329.
47 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1801 (1967).
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be applied. Irby should have been punished for either housebreaking or
robbery but not both consecutively.4
The prohibition against multiple punishment is designed to guarantee that
a defendant's sentence will fairly approximate, and not exceed, his criminal
liability. This constitutional double jeopardy proviso is not a restriction on the
legislature's power to define and punish offenses.49 It is, however, a limitation
on the judiciary in that it prevents courts from imposing multiple punishment
when it appears that the legislature did not so intend.5" When the legislature
does clearly indicate its intent with respect to cumulative sentences, either inthe
statute itself or its official legislative history, then the courts' task of construction
is at an end. In the vast majority of cases, however, no such unequivocal legislative intent is manifested. 5' Consequently, the court must resort to presumptions
about legislative intent to determine the unit of conviction established by a
statute. Yet, as has been seen, the generally accepted rules for determining the
identity of offenses have proved to be inadequate to explain the decisions involving certain combinations of offenses and have failed to offer guidelines for future
decisions. Therefore, if defendants are to be assured the protection that the
double jeopardy clause was intended to provide, substantial legislative revision
of these rules is necessary.
Admittedly, no statute can solve all the problems of substantive law encountered in regulating the imposition of punishment for related offenses. Nor
is a complete revision of substantive criminal law, aimed at eliminating many
instances of multiple coverage, feasible. But a future double jeopardy act could
provide that courts, when confronted with questions of multiple punishment, take
into consideration whether: (1) the illegal acts were a single continuing offense;
(2) the number of victims affected the gravity of an offense; (3) one offense was
included in another; (4) a specific statute should exclude a general one; (5)
in reaching the final result by successive acts under the same statute, an accused
has caused greater social harm or demonstrated more serious criminal intent than
if he had accomplished the same criminal result by a single act. 52 Moreover,
legislatures could aid statutory construction by indicating the extent to which new
penal statutes are designed to supplant or supplement existing acts and by issuing
general legislative directives to guide courts in their interpretation of substantive
law. Such steps would, as one commentator noted, "induce greater uniformity
and predictability of decision in the double jeopardy field."5 " Until such legislative assistance is forthcoming, the rule of lenity, despite its inadequacies, is still
the most equitable rule.
Leo G. Stoff, Jr.
48 Irby v. United States, No. 19988, at 25 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 17, 1967) (dissenting opinion).
49 The Supreme Court has noted that under federal law, there is nothing in the Constitution that would prevent Congress from punishing separately each step leading to the
consummation of a transaction. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11 (1927). See Parker,
Some Aspects of Double Jeopardy, 25 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 188, 195 (1951).
50 "In each case [where two or more statutes are violated] the court must decide on the
basis of its particular facts and the legislative intent whether . . . one or more punishments
can be inflicted." People v. Moore, 143 Cal. App. 2d 333, 299 P.2d 691, 697 (1956). See
also Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915).
51 See e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390, 394 (1958).
52 See Comment, supra note 10, at 367-68.
53 Id. at 367.

